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"I'll Know It When I See It... I Think":
United States v. Newman and Insider
Trading Legislation
Brett T. Atanasio*
ABSTRACT

The Second Circuit's decision in United States v. Newman has
reinvigorated an important and longstanding debate about insider
trading-whether insider trading should be explicitly prohibited by
statute.
In response to the Second Circuit's decision, Congress
introduced three bills to codify insider trading liability. Each bill takes a
different approach to codifying insider trading liability. Between the
three bills, two general approaches emerged. One approach is to impose
a broad prohibition on insider trading that arguably leaves the existing
insider trading regime untouched. The second approach develops a
narrower, carefully delineated standard of liability that departs from the
current insider trading regime in important ways. Both approaches
deserve careful scrutiny if Congress decides to move forward with
codifying insider trading liability by statute.
First, to provide a foundation, this Comment briefly traces the
judicial development of insider trading liability through the U.S.
Supreme Court's previous decisions on insider trading. Next, this
Comment discusses United States v. Newman and the executive and
judicial responses to that decision. This Comment then discusses the
need for codifying insider trading liability by statute and the potential
benefits of codification. Next, a careful analysis of each bill identifies its
strengths and weaknesses. Even small differences between bills impose
vastly different standards of liability and provide varying levels of
guidance for market actors, prosecutors, and the courts. Finally, this
Comment proposes changes to the bills' established frameworks and
* J.D. Candidate, Penn State Dickinson School of Law Class of 2017. The author is
tremendously grateful to everyone who gave comments and suggestions that improved
this Comment, and to his family and friends for their love and support. Special thanks
are owed to everyone at the Penn State Law Review for all of their hard work and
patience. Yet more thanks are owed to Karen Telis for being a peerless mentor and
friend. This Comment is dedicated to the memory of Kevin J. Sutherland.
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outlines other considerations Congress should consider if it decides to
codify insider trading liability by statute.
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INTRODUCTION

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit's
decision in United States v. Newman' has reinvigorated the debate about

insider trading. Specifically, Newman has revived one question of
particular importance to the debate-should insider trading be explicitly
prohibited by statute?
In Newman's wake, Congress proposed three bills that would
explicitly prohibit insider trading by statute.2 All three bills draw
substance from the judicial regime of insider trading liability, but also
depart from judicial doctrine in significant ways that could substantially
alter insider trading liability if enacted into law.
Therefore,
understanding how the proposed changes would transform insider trading
liability is essential to determining if the changes would be good policy.

1. United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 84
U.S.L.W. 3170 (U.S. Oct. 5, 2015) (No. 15-137).
2.

See infra Part Ill.
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First, this Comment will explore the judicial development of insider
trading liability, with particular emphasis on major U.S. Supreme Court
decisions and the Second Circuit's decision in Newman.3 Second, this
Comment will discuss the judicial, executive, and legislative branches'
responses to Newman.4 Finally, after discussing the need for codifying
insider trading liability by statute, this Comment will analyze the three
bills' substance and propose possible changes.'
II.

THE JUDICIAL AND REGULATORY INSIDER TRADING REGIME

A.

InsiderTrading Before Newman
1.

Early Insider Trading Liability

In the aftermath of the stock market collapse that precipitated the
Great Depression, Congress enacted the Securities Act of 1933
("Securities Act") and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange
Act").6 The general purposes of these laws were to ensure fair markets
for securities, prevent undue advantages among investors, and provide
open and orderly markets.
Although there is some evidence that
Congress was concerned about insider trading when it enacted the
Exchange Act,8 Congress did not, and has never, defined insider trading
by statute.9 However, § 10(b) of the Exchange Act provides that:
[I]t shall be unlawful for any person . . [tlo use or employ, in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a
national securities exchange or any security not so registered . .. any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of
such rules and regulations as the [SEC] may prescribe . .. 10

3. Infra Part II.
4. Infra Part II.C.
5. Infra Part ll.
6. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (2012); Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78pp (2012).
7. See Robert Steinbuch, Mere Thieves, 67 MD. L. REv. 570, 572 n.16 (2008);
Richard Painter et al., Don't Ask, Just Tell: Insider Trading After United States v.
O'Hagan, 84 VA. L. REv. 153, 175 n.97 (1998).
8. See Matthew T.M. Feeks, Turned Inside-Out: The Development of "Outsider
Trading" and How Dorozhko May Expand the Scope of Insider Trading Liability, 7 J.L.
ECON. & POL'Y 61, 63 (2010) (noting concerns about insider trading expressed by
Congress when developing the Exchange Act).
9. See Donna M. Nagy, Insider Trading and the Gradual Demise of Fiduciary
Principles, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1315, 1320-21, 1322-23 (2009) (noting that "no federal
statute directly prohibits the offense of insider trading").
10.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012).
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The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and courts,
therefore, prohibit fraud in the securities market, including insider
trading, through section 10(b)." Additionally, the SEC promulgated
Rule lOb-5,1 2 the primary enforcement tool prohibiting insider trading,
which provides that:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly . . (a) [t]o
employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) [t]o make any
untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or (c)
[t]o engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security. 13
Additionally, § 32(a) of the Exchange Actl 4 provides criminal
penalties for willful violations of the Exchange Act or rules promulgated
thereunder." For decades after the Exchange Act was passed, the SEC
ignored the practice of insider trading.1 6 However, the SEC eventually
concluded that insider trading violated Rule 1 Ob-5's antifraud provisions
and brought the seminal proceeding In re Cady, Roberts & Co.1 7 The
SEC held in this administrative proceeding that securities professionals
who traded on undisclosed inside information violated § 10(b) and Rule
1Ob-5.1 8 The SEC pursued a broad theory of liability, the so-called
11. See Thomas C. Newkirk, Assoc. Dir., Div. of Enf't & Melissa A. Robertson,
Senior Counsel, Div. of Enf't, Speech at the 16th Int'l Symposium On Econ. Crime:
Insider Trading-A U.S. Perspective (Sept. 19, 1998), http://www.sec.gov/news
/speech/speecharchive/1998/spch221.htm (explaining the development of insider trading
law).
12.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2015).
13. Id. The SEC has also promulgated several other rules defining liability for
insider trading under Rule I Ob-5. In Rule I 0b5- 1, the SEC set forth a general rule that §
10(b) and Rule lOb-5 prohibit trading on the basis of material, nonpublic information "in
breach of a duty of trust or confidence that is owed directly, indirectly, or derivatively to
the issuer" of such securities, shareholders of the issuer, or the source of the information.
Id. § 240.10b5-1(a). The Rule also broadly defines when a person trades "on the basis
of' material, nonpublic information (essentially, when one is aware of the information
when entering into a transaction), and provides affirmative defenses to liability. Id. §
240.10b5-1(b)-(c). Additionally, Rule 10b5-2 lists "non-exclusive" circumstances where
a duty of trust or confidence exists that, if breached, can give rise to liability for
misappropriation. Id. § 240.10b5-2 (2015). There are also other rules relevant to insider
trading. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (2015) (regulating the use of material,
nonpublic information in tender offers).
14.
15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (2012).
15. Id.
16.

STEPHEN J. CHOI & A.C. PRITCHARD, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND

ANALYSIS 336 (4th ed. 2015).

17.
18.

In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
Id. at 911.
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"equal access theory," which courts initially accepted. 19 Under the equal
access theory, also called the "parity-of-information theory," any insider
who possesses inside information may not trade in the relevant security.20
However, the parity-of-information theory's days were numbered.
2.

"Classical Theory" and Chiarella

Eventually, the Supreme Court pushed back against the SEC's
21
the
In United States v. Chiarella,
parity-of-information theory.
Supreme Court established the "classical theory" of insider trading
liability.2 2 In Chiarella, the defendant, who worked for a printer, was
given documents announcing corporate takeovers. 23 Although the names
of the companies were hidden, the defendant was able to deduce the
identities of the target companies and purchased stock in those
companies.24 The defendant then sold the stock after the takeovers were
publicly announced and pocketed over $30,000.25
The Supreme Court in Chiarellaheld that the defendant could not

be held liable for insider trading under § 10(b), explaining that "[w]hen
an allegation of fraud is based upon nondisclosure, there can be no fraud
absent a duty to speak." 2 6 The Court clarified that, for the purposes of
insider trading liability, a duty to speak is created by a fiduciary duty
between a corporate insider and the stockholders of a corporation-that
is, a fiduciary duty between the insider and the person with whom he is
trading.27 Conversely, if a person is neither "an insider nor a fiduciary,"
then he or she "ha[s] no obligation to reveal material facts" to the person
with whom he or she is trading. 28 Because the defendant in Chiarella
was not an insider to the corporations, he had no duty to disclose
information about the takeover to the party with whom he was trading,
and, therefore, his conduct was not fraud under § 10(b). 2 9

19. See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 851-52 (2d Cir. 1968)
("Rule lOb-5 is the implementation of the Congressional purpose that all investors should
have equal access to the rewards of participation in securities transactions. It was the
intent of Congress that all members of the investing public should be subject to identical
market risks .... ), abrogatedby United States v. Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
20. See Edward Greene & Olivia Schmid, Duty-Free Insider Trading?, 2013
COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 369, 386 (2013).
21. , United States v. Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
22. Id. at 234-35.
23. Id. at 224.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 235.
27. Id. at 231-32.
28. Id. at 229.
29. See id. at 231-33, 235.
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Importantly, the Court in Chiarella explicitly rejected the equal
access/parity-of-information theory of liability advanced by the SEC.3 o
The Court observed that "not every instance of financial unfairness
constitutes fraudulent activity under § 10(b)." 3 1 The Court held that the
trial court and court of appeals' theory that the defendant had a "duty to
everyone; to all sellers, indeed, to the market as a whole[,]" was
incorrect, and there was no Congressional intent to impose such a "broad
duty" under the securities laws. 32 Chiarella thus flat-out rejected the
parity of information theory as inconsistent with existing securities laws.
Furthermore, the case also established that the "classical theory" of
insider trading liability is premised on the breach of a fiduciary duty
owed by the insider to the other trading party.33
3.

"Misappropriation Theory" and O'Hagan

In Chiarella, the Court would not address the government's
alternative theory of liability-that the defendant breached a duty to the
corporation who provided the information, rather than the other trading
party-because that theory was not presented at trial.34 Therefore, the
Court avoided deciding the "misappropriation theory's" validity, leaving
the issue for another day.
The Supreme Court gave the misappropriation theory its stamp of
approval 35 in United States v. O'Hagan.36 In O'Hagan, the defendant
was a partner at a law firm representing Grand Met in a tender offer for
Pillsbury Company stock.3 7 Before the tender offer was public
knowledge, O'Hagan began purchasing shares and call options of
Pillsbury common stock.38 Then, when the tender offer was announced,
O'Hagan sold his options and stock.
The Court upheld O'Hagan's convictions for mail fraud and
Exchange Act violations. 40 Even though O'Hagan was not a Pillsbury
insider and did not owe a duty to the shareholders he traded with, the
Court found that O'Hagan breached a duty owed to his law firm and

30. Id.
31. Chiarella,445 U.S. at 232.
32. Id. at 231, 233.
33. Id. at 231-33.
34. Id. at 235-36.
35. But see Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 24 (1987) (tying four to four on
the question when raised previously).
36. United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
37. Id. at 647.
38. Id. at 647-48.
39. Id. at 648.
40. Id. at 678.
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Grand Met. 4 1 The Court explained that "the misappropriation theory
outlaws trading on the basis of nonpublic information by a corporate
'outsider' in breach of a duty owed not to a trading party, but to the
source of the information." 4 2 Thus, by premising liability on breaching a
duty owed to the source of the information, the Court expanded the reach
of insider trading liability to "outsiders."43
4.

Tippee Liability and Dirks

While Chiarella and O'Hagan established standards of liability for
those who directly obtained inside information, the Supreme Court has
expanded liability even further. The Supreme Court, in Dirks v. SEC,4
established liability for "tippees"-persons who receive material,
nonpublic information from an insider, rather than from their own
position of trust. 45

Dirks was an officer at a broker-dealer firm that

provided investment analysis. 46 A former Equity Funding of America
("EFA") officer informed Dirks that EFA employees were claiming that
the company had fraudulently overstated its assets, but regulatory
agencies had declined to act on the allegations.47 As Dirks investigated
the accusations and received corroboration from other EFA company
employees and officers, Dirks discussed his findings with his own clients
and investors, some of whom then sold their EFA stock.48
Word of Dirks' investigation began to spread, and insurance
authorities uncovered evidence of the fraud in their own investigation.4 9
The SEC brought charges against EFA and Dirks, who allegedly aided
and abetted securities law violations.o The SEC maintained that Dirks

41. See id. at 652, 653 n.5 (agreeing with the government's theory that O'Hagan
breached a duty to his employer and their client, and explaining that O'Hagan could not
escape liability simply because he was associated with, and gained inside information
from, Grand Met (vis-A-vis his firm), not Pillsbury (whose stock he traded)).
42. Id. at 652-53. The Court also noted that the use of information was "in
connection with" a transaction because the fraudulent use of the information occurred
when, without disclosure to the source, the fiduciary used the information to trade. Id. at
656.
43. Id. at 653. See also Adam R. Nelson, Note, Extending Outsider Trading
Liability to Thieves, 80 FORDHAM L. REv. 2157, 2192 (2012) (noting that the Court's
decision in O'Hagan, inter alia, expanded "insider" trading liability to outsiders in some
circumstances and arguing that extending liability to thieves of inside information is a
"logical extension" of that principle).
44. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
45. Id. at 656, 661.
46. Id. at 648.
47. Id. at 648-49.
48. Id. at 649.
49. Id. at 650.
50. Id.
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was a tipper because Dirks repeated the allegations of fraud to investors,
who then sold their stocks based on that inside information. 1
On appeal, the Supreme Court held that Dirks was not liable as a
tippee or as a tipper. 52 The Court explained that tippees assume the
insider/tipper's duty to shareholders because the tippee is improperly
given the information in violation of a fiduciary duty, not because the
tipeee simply receives material, nonpublic information.5 3 Thus, a tippee
assumes liability "when the insider has breached his fiduciary duty to the
shareholders by disclosing the information to the tippee and the tippee
knows or should know that there has been a breach." 5 4
The Court then explained how to determine whether the insider/
tipper violated his or her fiduciary duty. "[T]he test is whether the
insider personally will benefit, directly or indirectly, from his disclosure.
Absent some personal gain, there has been no breach of duty to
stockholders. And absent a breach by the insider, there is no derivative
breach [by the tippee].""5 Thus, the court must determine whether the
disclosure resulted in a personal benefit to the tipper, "such as a
pecuniary gain or a reputational benefit that will translate into future
earnings." 5 6 Furthermore, the Court explained that there could be a
"relationship between the insider and the recipient that suggests a quid
pro quo from the latter, or an intention to benefit the particular
recipient."5 7 Finally, the Court stated that "the elements of fiduciary duty
and exploitation . .. also exist when an insider makes a gift of
confidential information to a trading relative or friend."5 8 The Court,
however, acknowledged that whether the tipper personally benefitted
will not always be easy to determine. 59
Turning to the facts at hand, the Court in Dirks found that no tipper
gave Dirks information in breach of a fiduciary duty. 60 The Court
reasoned that the tippers did not intend to receive a personal benefit, but
61
rather, were attempting to expose wrongdoing within the company.
Because there was no benefit to the tippers, Dirks had not assumed a

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. at 650-51.
Id. at 667.
Id. at 660.
Dirks, 463 U.S. at 660.
Id. at 662.
Id. at 663.
Id. at 664.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 666.
Id. at 666-67.
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fiduciary duty, and, thus, Dirks could not be held liable as a tipper for
disclosing the information to investors.62
B.

United States v. Newman

Because the Second Circuit's decision in Newman was the impetus
for the recent legislative fervor over insider trading, a brief discussion of
the case is necessary to understand the proposed legislation.
1.

Facts

In Newman, a group of securities analysts allegedly obtained
material nonpublic information about technology companies, shared the
information amongst themselves and others, and traded securities based
on that information. 6 3 The two defendant-appellants were Todd
Newman, a portfolio manager at Diamondback Capital Management,
LLC ("Diamondback"), and Anthony Chiasson, a portfolio manager at
Level Global Investors, L.P. ("Level").64 Information related to Dell and
NVIDIA stocks worked its way down a chain of tippers to both Newman
and Chiasson, who traded on those tips. 6 5
The Department of Justice brought charges against Newman and
Chiasson for securities fraud in violation of § 10(b) and § 32 of the
Exchange Act.66 After the government rested its case, Newman and
Chiasson moved for acquittal, arguing that there was no evidence that
Newman or Chiasson knew about any personal benefit given to the
insiders in exchange for the information.67 After reserving judgment on
the motions, the district court denied the defendants' requested jury
instruction that the government had to prove the defendants knew of the

62. Id. at 667.
63. United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 442 (2d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 84
U.S.L.W. 3170 (U.S. Oct. 5, 2015) (No. 15-137).
64. Id.
65. Id. With respect to the Dell trades, Newman was three steps removed from the
insider and Chiasson was four steps removed. Id. Specifically, Rob Ray, a Dell
employee, tipped information about Dell's upcoming earnings to Sandy Goyal; Goyal
then gave the information to a Diamondback analyst, Jesse Tortura; Tortura then gave the
information to Newman and a Level analyst; the Level analyst then gave the information
to Chiasson. Id. With respect to the NVIDIA trades, both Newman and Chiasson were
four steps removed from the insiders. Specifically, Chris Choi of NVIDIA gave earnings
information to Hyung Lim, whom he knew from church; Lim then gave the information
to Danny Kuo, who gave the information to members of the analyst ring, including
Tortura and Adondakis (a Level analyst), who, respectively, tipped the information to
Newman and Chiasson. Id. at 442.
66. Id. at 443.
67. Id. at 444.
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personal benefit the insiders received.68 The jury found the defendants
guilty on all counts and the district court sentenced both.69
2.

Second Circuit Decision

On appeal in Newman, the defendants renewed their argument from
the trial: the government had not shown that the defendants knew the
inside information was given in breach of a fiduciary duty because there
was no evidence the defendants knew what, if any, benefit the insiders
received in exchange for the earnings information.7 0 The defendants
argued that such proof was necessary for tippee liability under Dirks.71
The Second Circuit panel agreed with the defendants. 72 The panel
acknowledged that the Second Circuit had not always been clear about
what was required for tippee liability, but stated that "the Supreme Court
was quite clear in Dirks."" The panel interpreted Dirks to establish,
inter alia, that "a tippee is liable only if he knows or should have known
of the breach." 74 The breach of duty under Dirks, the panel explained,
was divulging material, nonpublic information in exchange for a
personal benefit. Therefore, to "know of the breach" the tippee must
know what personal benefit was received in exchange for the
*
76
information.
The Second Circuit also hinted at displeasure with the Government
in Newman. The panel observed that the Government's "overreliance"
on dicta "highlight[ed] the doctrinal novelty of its recent insider trading
prosecutions." 77 The panel also noted that "[a]lthough the government
might like the law to be different, nothing in the law requires a symmetry
of information in the nation's securities markets." 78
The panel then sifted through the evidence presented at trial to
determine if denial of the defendants' proposed jury instruction was
harmless. With respect to the Dell tips and trades, the panel observed
that Ray and Goyal were not close friends, and the career advice Goyal
gave Ray was something he would have given anyone.79 With respect to
the NVIDIA tips and trades, the evidence showed that Lim and Choi
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 442, 444.
Id. at 444.
Id. at 450, 455.
Newman, 773 F.3d at 447.
Id. (citing to Dirks generally, but presumably with reference to 465 U.S. at 660).
Id.
Id. at 448.
Id.
Id. at 448-49.

79.

Id. at 452.
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were "family friends" who met through church and occasionally
socialized, but Lim testified that he had not provided Choi with anything
of value in exchange for earnings information.8 0
Ultimately, the panel held that these facts did not establish a
benefit.8 The panel noted that a personal benefit can include "not only
pecuniary gain, but also, inter alia, any reputational benefit that will
translate into future earnings and the benefit one would obtain from
simply making a gift of confidential information to a trading relative or
friend." 82 The panel also acknowledged that Dirks suggests a personal
benefit could be inferred based on the relationship between the tipper and
tippee.83
However, the panel held "that such an inference is
impermissible in the absence of proof of a meaningfully close personal
relationship that generates an exchange that is objective, consequential,
and represents at least a gain of a pecuniary or similarly valuable
nature." 8 4 In addition, the personal benefit "must be of some
consequence."
Therefore, the panel found the alleged benefits were
insufficient to satisfy this standard and ultimately vacated the
defendants' convictions.86
C.

The Aftermath of Newman

The judiciary, the Manhattan U.S. Attorney's Office, high profile
insider trading convicts, and the press all reacted with fervor to Newman.
The Second Circuit denied the Government's petition for a rehearing en
banc, 87 and Second Circuit panels and district courts began applying the
Newman standard. 88 In Newman's wake, a wave of high profile
defendants have contested their insider trading convictions, arguing that

80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Newman, 773 F.3d at 452.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 452-55.
87. United States v. Newman, No. 13-1837(L), 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 5788, at *4
(2d Cir. Apr. 3, 2015).
88. See, e.g., Joseph Ax, U.S. Court sees 'serious questions' in insider trading
appeal, RUETERS (June 23, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/06/23/usa-crimeinsidertrading-riley-idUSLlNOZ91XY20150623 (reporting that a Second Circuit panel
ordered, without written opinion, that David Riley did not have to report to jail for his
insider trading conviction pending his appeal based on Newman); see also United States
v. Riley, 90 F. Supp. 3d 176, 181, 185-89 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (applying Newman but
refusing to reverse the appellant's conviction because the district court's instruction was
not plain error).
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there was insufficient evidence of knowledge of a personal benefit to
sustain their convictions.
The Ninth Circuit, however, expressed trepidation about following
Newman. In United States v. Salman,90 Maher Kara, the defendant's
brother-in-law, gave insider information to his brother, Michael Kara,
who then gave it to the defendant.91 The defendant, Salman, then traded
on that information. 92 On appeal, Salman argued that under Newman
there was insufficient evidence that Maher received a personal benefit in
exchange for the information or that Salman knew of such a benefit. 9 3
The Ninth Circuit panel 94 stated, however, that "[t]o the extent Newman
can be read to go so far, we decline to follow it." 95 Rather, the panel
concluded that, in accordance with Dirks, when an insider makes a gift of
inside information to a trading relative or friend, tippee liability should
follow. 9 6 Perhaps in an effort to avoid creating a circuit split, the Ninth
Circuit panel observed that its decision might not conflict with
Newman. 97 The Supreme Court granted certiorari, with oral arguments
pending as this Comment goes to publication.98
After the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Salman, the First
Circuit suggested a preference for Salman's broader reading of Dirks in
United States v. Parigian.99 The First Circuit, comparing Newman and
Salman, observed that "the Ninth Circuit seem[s] to align itself more
closely with our [precedent]."'0o However, the panel was able to avoid
89. See, e.g., Motion of Law in Support of Defendant Raj Rajaratnam's Motion
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to Vacate Convictions and Sentence at 13-14, United States
v. Rajaratnam, No. 1:09-cr-01184-LAP (S.D.N.Y. June 6, 2015); Brief for Appellant at
19-25, United States v. Martoma, No. 14-3599 (2d Cir. Feb. 2, 2015); see also United
States v. Whitman, 115 F. Supp. 3d 439, 441 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (rejecting the defendant's
"overbroad" reading of Newman and collecting other cases that were appealed on the
same issue).
90. United States v. Salman, 792 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 84
U.S.L.W. 3401 (U.S. Jan. 19, 2016) (No. 15-628).
91. Id. at 1089.
92. Id. at 1088-89.
93. Id. at 1090.
94. Serendipitously, one of the Ninth Circuit panel judges (and the author of the
opinion) was Southern District of New York Judge Jed Rakoff, sitting by designation
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 292(a), which allows for the assignment of district court judges
to appellate panels. 28 U.S.C. § 292(a) (2012); see also Peter J. Henning, Judge Rakoff
Ruling on Tips May Help Prosecution, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (July 7, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/08/business/dealbook/judge-rakoff-ruling-on-tips-mayhelp-prosecution-on-insider-trading-cases.html?_r--1.
95. Salman, 792 F.3d at 1093.
96. Id. at 1093-94.
97. See id. at 1093-94 (observing that Newman recognized that Dirks suggests
liability be imposed where information was gifted to a trading relative or friend).
98. 84 U.S.L.W. 3401 (U.S. Jan. 19, 2016) (No. 15-628).
99. United States v. Parigian, 824 F.3d 5, 16 (1st Cir. 2016).
100. Id.
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the issue because the tipper and tippee were close golfing buddies and
the tipper received promises of gifts in exchange for the inside
information. 10' As such, under either Newman or Salman, the court
found there was likely a sufficient personal benefit. 10 2 The court also
acknowledged that insider trading law has been in a state of confusion
since the Second Circuit decided Newman.103 In a second opinion,
addressing the appeal of the tipper from Parigian, the First Circuit
explained that the personal benefit requirement could be satisfied by
concrete benefits like wine or steak, or by "benefits as thin as"
maintaining a relationship or a gift to a friend.1 04 The First Circuit thus
seems to have aligned itself with the Ninth Circuit's more relaxed
reading of Dirks.
The executive branch's response to Newman was more forceful than
the judiciary's. Preet Bharara, the U.S. Attorney for the Southern
District of New York, called the Newman decision "dramatically
wrong. "1o
The press reported that -Newman was a serious blow to
Bharara1 ' and that the panel's clear displeasure with the prosecution
might be explained by tension between the U.S. Attorney's office and the
federal bench.' 07 Perhaps because some of its highest-profile convictions
are now on the line, the U.S. Attorney's office has forcefully objected to
appeals based on Newman and has urged courts to construe the case's
holding as narrowly as possible. 108
The Department of Justice ultimately appealed Newman to the
Supreme Court.1 09 The Government argued in its petition for certiorari

.

101. Id.at8-9,16.
102. Id. at 16.
103. Id. at 16 ("How this will all play out, we do not venture to say ....
104. United States v. McPhail, No. 15-2106, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 13581, at *2223 (1st Cir. July 26, 2016).
105. James B. Stewart, Some Fear Fallout From Preet Bharara's Tension With
Judges, N.Y. TwIEs: DEALBOOK (Apr. 16, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015
/04/17/business/preet-bharara-and-federal-judges-trade-barbs-and-some-fearconsequences.html. Bharara has gained widespread media attention for his aggressive
stance on insider trading and financial crime. See, e.g., Sally Jenkins, The brash New
York prosecutor who's indicting left and right, WASH. POST (Mar. 24, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/the-brash-new-york-prosecutor-whos-indictingleft-and-right/2015/03/29/64472702-c412-11e4-9271-610273846239 story.html (giving
a brief biography of Bharara and highlighting some of his more famous cases).
106. See, e.g., Michael Rothfeld & Susan Pulliam, Did Preet Bharara Overreach?,
WALL STREET JOURNAL (Dec. 10, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/did-preet-bhararaoverreach-1418262707 (calling Newman a "big setback" to Bharara).
107. See Stewart, supra note 105.
108. See, e.g., Brief for the United States at 11-12, United States v. Martoma, No.
14-3599 (2d Cir. May 4, 2015) (arguing that Newman could not change the defendant's
conviction because the evidence was stronger than that which was presented in Newman).
109. Petition for Certiorari at 1, United States V. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. July
30, 2015) (No. 15-137).
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that Newman was contrary to Dirks and raised serious policy concerns. 1 o
The Government also read the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Salman to
directly conflict with Newman and urged the Supreme Court to settle the
perceived circuit split.'
The Supreme Court, however, denied the
Government's petition without comment."12
Ostensibly in response to Newman, Congress introduced three bills:
S. 702, The Stop Illegal Insider Trading Act ("Reed-Menendez Bill"),' 13
H.R. 1625, the Insider Trading Prohibition Act ("Himes Bill"),1 14 and
H.R. 1173, the Ban Insider Trading Act of 2015 (rather unfortunately,
"Lynch Bill")."'5 Each bill takes steps to explicitly prohibit insider
trading. 16
III. AN ANALYSIS OF POST-NEWMAN INSIDER TRADING LEGISLATION

The remainder of this Comment will proceed on two assumptions.
First, this Comment assumes that insider trading is harmful to the
investing public and the market.' 17 Second, this Comment assumes that
insider trading should, in some contexts, be prohibited by law.
Arguments to the contrary' 18 will not be debated in this Comment.
This Comment will next discuss three issues. First, it will discuss
the need for legislation codifying insider trading liability by statute."'
Second, it will consider what factors are relevant in analyzing the
legislation introduced in response to Newman.12 0 Third, it will analyze
each of the three bills to assess each one's potential impact on insider
trading liability. 12 1

110.

Id. at 15-22.

111.

Id. at 22-24, 33.

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

84 U.S.L.W. 3170 (U.S. Oct. 5,2015) (No. 15-137).
Stop Illegal Insider Trading Act, S. 702, 114th Cong. (2015).
Insider Trading Prohibition Act, H.R. 1625, 114th Cong. (2015).
Ban Insider Trading Act of 2015, H.R. 1173, 114th Cong. (2015).
S. 702 § 2; H.R. 1173 § 2; H.R. 1625 § 2.

117.
See Insider Trading, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (last updated Jan.
15, 2013), http://www.sec.gov/answers/insider.htm (stating that insider trading
"undermines investor confidence in the fairness and integrity of the markets").
118. See, e.g., Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of Insider
Trading, 35 STAN. L. REv. 857, 864, 868, 871 (1982) (arguing, inter alia, that insider
trading can be beneficial to firms and shareholders and could be prohibited by corporate
charters or employment contracts); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Is Insider Trading Bad? If so,
Why?, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (Apr. 1, 2010, 10:47 AM), http://www.professor
bainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2010/04/is-insider-trading-bad-if-so-why.html
(arguing that insider trading can result in more accurate pricing of securities); HENRY G.
MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET 138 (1st ed. 1966) (arguing that
insider trading can be an efficient and appropriate means of compensation).
119. See infra Part III.A.
120. See infra Part III.B.
121. See infra Part III.C.

2016]
A.

"I'LL KNow IT WHEN I SEE IT... ITHNK"

23
235

The Need for Legislation

Many scholars have discussed the need for a statutory codification
of insider trading liability, or at least criticized the lack thereof. 12 2 While
an explicit statutory codification would have many benefits, this
Comment will discuss only a few.
First, codifying insider trading liability into statute would provide
clarity and certainty.123 Because insider trading liability spawned from a
broad provision of the Exchange Act, the elements and theories of
liability have evolved over time based on court opinions. 124
To
demonstrate, the Second Circuit in Newman announced elements of
liability which the court maintained did not need to be stated in their
prior decisions that outlined other elements of liability. 125 Similarly,
because courts, including the Supreme Court, have been willing to accept
new theories of liability, 12 6 it can be difficult for actors in the securities
markets to know if their conduct is lawful. 127 Such uncertainty also
extends to prosecutors, who may believe their theory of liability is

122.
See, e.g., Richard M. Phillips & Larry R. Lavoie, The SEC's ProposedInsider
Trading Legislation: Insider Trading Controls, Corporate Secrecy, and Full Disclosure,

39 ALA. L. REv. 439, 455 (1988) (arguing that codifying insider trading by statute would
help maintain investor confidence in the securities markets); Greene & Schmid, supra

note 20, at 425-28 (arguing that Congressional action could expand the scope of insider
trading liability from its jurisprudential restraints, clarify the applicability of liability to
certain conduct, and harmonize standards across nations); Painter, supra note 7, at 159,
198 (arguing that the legislative or administrative rulemaking process is better suited to

considering the scholarly insider trading debate and that allowing judicial development of
this law raises separation of powers concerns and the specter of retroactive imposition);
Steinbuch, supra note 7, at 613-14 (observing that almost every other nation that

prohibits insider trading defines the offense statutorily and claiming that Congress's
"institutional paralysis" has left the field to judicial interpretation); Nagy, supra note 9, at
1320-21, 1366-69 (suggesting that the courts and SEC have developed a revisionist
and/or results-oriented body of law and arguing that Congress's failure to act "has come
at the cost of clarity, consistency, and legitimacy").
123.
Phillips & Lavoie, supra note 122, at 456 (arguing that an insider trading statute
would bring rationality to insider trading law, articulate a clear rationale of its
undesirability, and provide guidance to market actors).

124. See, e.g., United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 660-62 (1997) (holding that
Chiarellaleft open the validity of the misappropriation theory).
125. See United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 448 (2d Cir. 2014), cert. denied,
84 U.S.L.W. 3170 (U.S. Oct. 5, 2015) (No. 15-137) (rejecting the government's
argument that United States v. Jiau, 734 F.3d 147 (2d Cir. 2013) implicitly held that a
tippee need not know of the personal benefit because that issue was not reached in Jiau).
126. See, e.g., United States v. Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222, 231-32 (1980) (establishing
liability for insiders); O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 660-62 (validating the misappropriation
theory and expanding liability to outsiders).
127. See Phillips & Lavoie, supra note 122, at 456 (arguing that the judicial
development of insider trading law does not establish a "rational, comprehensible
definition" to which actors can conform to predictably avoid liability).
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consistent with precedent only to have courts rebuff their argument.1 2 8
Lower courts also face uncertainty under the current regime-a court
may strive to adhere to precedent only to end up overruled on appeal.1 2 9
By clearly articulating the elements and scope of liability, Congress
could provide market actors, prosecutors, regulators, and the courts with
greater certainty.
Congressional action would also have other benefits beyond clarity
and certainty. More clearly articulated standards of liability would
provide interpretational guidance for courts. 130 By defining the scope of
insider trading liability and identifying specific conduct that will be
considered criminal, Congress would provide courts with a clearer
legislative background to assess whether the conduct at issue should be
swept into the statutory prohibition. 131
The benefits discussed above provide guidance for deciding which
factors are relevant in analyzing potential legislation. Assuming that
realizing these benefits are goals in crafting insider trading legislation,
the way each bill achieves those benefits, or fails to achieve them, is
critical to analyzing which proposal is best and how to improve each.
B.

Factors in Analyzing the Bills

This Comment will focus on four factors in assessing the three bills
proposed in Newman's wake. The first factor is clarity, which this
Comment will use to mean the extent to which the legislation provides an
unambiguous articulation of the elements and boundaries of liability.
Clear language is necessary because, as discussed above, it reduces
uncertainty for relevant actors and allows .Congress, rather than the
courts, to establish liability, which is a key benefit.
The second factor is overcriminalization. Each bill will be analyzed
for how far it allows liability to stretch. This factor is important because
the judicial development of insider trading liability has been criticized
128. See, e.g., Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 231-33. There, the government pursued its
equal access theory, which had previously been approved by lower courts, only to have it
fumly rejected by the Supreme Court. Id.
129. See, e.g., SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2009). There, the district court
interpreted the Supreme Court's insider trading rulings to require a breach of fiduciary
duty, and, therefore, denied the SEC's request for a preliminary injunction. Id. at 49, 51.
However, the Second Circuit held that a breach of a fiduciary duty was not required,
vacated the district court's decision, and remanded. Id.
130. See Richard M. Phillips & Robert J. Zutz, The Insider Trading Doctrine: A
Need for Legislative Repair, 13 HOFSTRA L. REv. 65, 69-71 (1984) (arguing that the
judicial regime focuses on policing insider conduct rather than protecting investors (the
original purpose of the securities laws)).
131. See infra Part Efl.C.2 (discussing the Himes Bill and its implications for trading
on stolen, material, nonpublic information).
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for reaching conduct better addressed by civil and regulatory action. 13 2
The term overcriminalization can have different meanings and
connotations.133 This Comment will consider overcriminalization in the
context of what conduct the legislation would criminalize compared to
the existing judicially created regime and how the legislation could be
interpreted to encompass new or similar conduct.
The third factor is the extent to which each bill would disrupt the
status quo. While many people are dissatisfied with the current insider
trading regime, a substantial change in liability could cause at least
temporary uncertainty in the law as market actors, prosecutors, and
courts adapt to the new legislative regime. Thus, the extent of the
changes from the existing regime should be considered in analyzing the
proposed legislation.
The fourth factor is the extent to which the legislation responds to
Newman. While the issues around codifying insider trading go well
beyond the relatively narrow issue presented in Newman, these bills are,
at least ostensibly, responding to Newman.' 34 Furthermore, since the
Supreme Court declined to review Newman, the Second Circuit's
decision is binding on lower courts within the Second Circuit absent
Congressional action to overrule it. Therefore, the means by which each
bill responds to Newman and the bill's effectiveness in responding. to
Newman are important to consider.
132.
J. Kelly Strader, (Re)Conceptualizing Insider Trading: United States v.
Newman and the Intent to Defraud, 80 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1419, 1423 (2015).
133.
See Kip Schlegal et al., Are White Collar Crimes Overcriminalized? Some
Evidence on the Use of Criminal Sanctions Against Securities Violators, 28 W. ST. U. L.
REv. 117, 120-21, 140 (2001) (considering "overcriminalization" to include

considerations of whether conduct should be regarded as criminal and how frequently the
law punishes conduct, but suggesting that accusations of overcriminalization for
securities law violations are not borne out by evidence). With respect to insider trading
specifically, overcriminalization may even turn on whether insider trading is morally
objectionable-if it is not, then any criminalization is theoretically overcriminalization.
Id. at 120; compare Stephen M. Bainbridge, Insider Trading, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW
AND EcoNoMiCs 772, 777 (Boudewijn Boukaert & Gerrit De Gees eds., 2000)
(recounting Henry Manne's arguments that insider trading is beneficial because it
establishes price accuracy and is an efficient compensation scheme for managers), with
Insider Trading, supra note 117 (stating that insider trading "undermines investor
confidence in the fairness and integrity of the markets").
134. See Press Release, Office of Congressman Jim Himes, Himes Introduces
Bipartisan Bill to Define and Prohibit Illegal Insider Trading (Mar. 25, 2015),
http://himes.house.gov/press-release/himes-introduces-bipartisan-bill-define-andprohibit-illegal-insider-trading [hereinafter Himes Release]; Press Release, Office of
Senator Robert Menendez, Sens. Reed & Menendez Introduce Bill to Clearly Define and
Ban Unlawful Insider Trading (Mar. 11, 2015), http://www.menendez.senate.gov/newsand-events/press/sens-reed-and-menendez-introduce-bill-to-clearly-define-and-banunlawful-insider-trading; Press Release, Office of Congressman Stephen Lynch, Lynch
Introduces Bill to Ban Insider Trading (Mar. 2, 2015), http://lynch.house.gov/pressrelease/lynch-introduces-bill-ban-insider-trading [hereinafter Lynch Release],
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The Reed-Menendez Bill

The Reed-Menendez Bill, introduced in the Senate, would amend
10 of the Exchange Act to read:

§

It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the
mails, or of any facility of any national security exchange ... [t]o
purchase, sell or cause the purchase or sale of any security on the
basis of material information that the person knows or has reason to
know is not publicly available. 135
The bill also prohibits recklessly communicating material,
nonpublic information when it is reasonably foreseeable that the
communication would result in a violation of the above prohibition.1 3 6
Reed-Menendez appears to provide a safe harbor for securities analysts
by exempting from "nonpublic information" any information developed
from publicly available sources.1 37 Finally, the bill permits the SEC to
establish exemptions from the bill's prohibitions and disclaims any other
effect on liability under § 10(b).1 38
The Reed-Menendez Bill's prohibition on insider trading could be
read extremely broadly. It does not provide any limitations on liability
except for its analyst safe harbor. 139 It does not enumerate certain
situations that would constitute insider trading.1 4 0 Therefore, the bill's
sweeping language seems to impose a broader standard of liability than
the judicial regime, prohibiting nearly all trading on the basis of material,
nonpublic information.141
Because the Reed-Menendez Bill's language provides little
guidance about the prohibition's breadth, the bill invites both the SEC
and courts to revert to the practices leading to the need for Congressional
intervention in the first place. First, such broad language could give the

135. Stop Illegal Insider Trading Act, S. 702, 114th Cong., § 2 (2015) (inserting §
10(d)(1)(A)).
136. Id. (inserting § 10(d)(1)(B)).
137. Id. (inserting § 10(d)(2)).
138. Id. (inserting §§ 10(d)(3)-4)).
139. Id.
140. Compare id. § 2 (inserting § 10(d)(1)(A) and containing only a broad
prohibition on trading based on material, nonpublic information), with Insider Trading
Prohibition Act, H.R. 1625, 114th Cong., § 2 (2015) (inserting § 16A(c)(1) and providing
an enumerated list of situations which make trading "wrongful" under the Act).
141. See Peter J. Henning, What's So Bad About Insider Trading Law?, 70 BUSINESS
LAWYER 751, 767 (2015) (noting that the Senate and House bills would impose liability
on "trading while in possession of almost all confidential information").
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SEC and prosecutors the opportunity to pursue broad theories of liability.
A ban on any trading "on the basis of material information that the
person knows or has reason to know is not publicly available"'1 4 2 sounds
strikingly like the parity-of-information theory of liability, which stated
that "[anyone] who ... receives material nonpublic information may not
use that information to trade in securities .

. .

."4 It is thus possible that

Reed-Menendez codifies the parity-of-information standard into law.
On the other hand, perhaps fearful of applying general, broad
language too expansively (a la Chiarella'"),courts might turn to the old
judicial regime of insider trading liability to help give meaning and limits
to Reed-Menendez's sweeping language. Because the Reed-Menendez
Bill is broad and provides little guidance, courts might read the bill as
merely codifying the previous judicial insider trading regime with its
existing contours and problems. Nor would it be unreasonable to do
so-it is an established tool of statutory interpretation that "if Congress
intends for legislation to change the interpretation of a judicially created
concept, it makes that intent specific."l 45 Courts would then need to
consider the bill's broad, general language against the Supreme Court's
longstanding rejection of the parity-of-information theory.'4 Given the
Court's strong rejection of that theory, this might persuade other courts
that the bill's broad, general language does not clearly show
Congressional intent to supplant the judicial regime of insider trading
with a parity-of-information standard.
Because a parity-of-information regime sweeps in conduct that was
not criminalized under the judicial regime, an argument to impose old
judicial limits on liability would likely be amplified by rule of lenity
concerns. As the Supreme Court has explained, "when choice has to be
made between two readings of what Congress has made a crime, it is
appropriate before [courts] choose the harsher alternative, to require that
Congress should have spoken in language that is clear and definite."l47
142. S. 702 § 2 (inserting § 10 (d)(1)(A)).
143. United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1365 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 445 U.S.
222 (1980).
144. United States v. Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222, 233 (1980) ("Formulation of such a
broad duty [as the parity-of-information theory] ... should not be undertaken absent
some explicit evidence of congressional intent.").
145. Midlantic Nat'1 Bank v. N.J. Dep't of Envt'1 Prot., 474 U.S. 494, 501 (1986);
see also Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 443 U.S. 256, 266-67 (1979)
("[S]ilence is most eloquent, for such reticence while contemplating an important and
controversial change in existing law is unlikely.").
146. Chiarella,445 U.S. at 233.
147. United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 221-22 (1952);
see also William Eskridge, Jr. & Phillip Frickey, Quasi-ConstitutionalLaw: Clear
Statement Rules as ConstitutionalLawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REv. 593, 600 (1992) (noting
that rule of lenity cases are an area where the Court has imposed "clear statement" rules).
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Given the backdrop of the judicial regime, and that reading ReedMenendez broadly results in a completely different liability standard,
courts could find that the bill's broad language is ambiguous as to
whether it imposes a parity-of-information standard.1 4 8 However, courts
might be wary of reading the bill as a Congressional endorsement of the
parity-of-information theory because a broad reading of Reed-Menendez
could criminalize so much previously legal conduct.
On the other hand, it is possible that Reed-Menendez is quite clear
about what Congress wanted. One could argue that despite the judicial
insider trading regime and the Supreme Court's rejection of the parity-ofinformation standard, Congress chose to go another way. 149 Under this
argument, just because the language of Reed-Menendez is broad does
not mean it is ambiguous.so If the statute is considered unambiguous,
then the presumption in favor of continuing judge-made-law is likely
overcome' 5 ' and the rule of lenity is inapplicable. 5 2 Nevertheless,
without something more in the legislative history or the legislation itself,
courts might be unwilling to make such a sharp turn away from the
existing standard to a parity-of-information standard.153
As the above discussion indicates, Reed-Menendez scores low
marks for "clarity." The current language can be read several ways, with
vastly divergent results for market participants, prosecutors, and courts.
Without a clearer statement or guidance, Reed-Menendez's language
could prompt a protracted struggle between prosecutors and the courts
over how the bill should be interpreted and applied, creating more
problems than it solves.
The Reed-Menendez Bill's ambiguity and uncertain breadth impacts
the assessment of other factors considered in this Comment. With
respect to overcriminalization, the bill at least provides a safe harbor for
analysts and gives the SEC the power to create further exemptions. 14
However, beyond that, a broad reading of the bill's prohibition could
148. See Universal C.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. at 221-22.
149. See Bruce W. Klaw, Why Now is the Time to Statutorily Ban Insider Trading
Under the Equality of Access Theory, 7 WM. & MARY Bus. L. REv. 275, 343-44 (2016)
(reading Reed-Menendez as consistent with the equal access theory and as rejecting the
existing judicial regime).
150. See Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 108 (1990) ("[W]e have declined to
deem a statute 'ambiguous' for the purposes of lenity merely because it was possible to
articulate a construction more narrow than that urged by the Government.").
151. Midlantic Nat'1 Bank v. N.J. Dep't of Envt'l Prot., 474 U.S. 494, 501 (1986).
152. Beecham v. United States, 511 U.S. 368, 374 (1994).
153. But see Klaw, supra note 149, at 342-44 (examining the statements of Senator
Reed and concluding that the Bill was intended to implement the parity-of-information
theory).
154. Stop Illegal Insider Trading Act, S. 702, 114th Cong., § 2 (2015) (inserting §§
10(d)(2)-(3)).
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vastly expand liability for insider trading, criminalizing a vast swath of
previously legal conduct.155 Similarly, it is difficult to determine the
impact Reed-Menendez would have on the status quo. A broad reading
would be extremely disruptive because so much conduct would become
criminal, but a narrow reading might not create any disruption if the bill
merely codifies the judicial regime.
Finally, one aspect that is clear about Reed-Menendez is that, at
least on its face, it does nothing to respond to or overrule the Second
Circuit's decision in Newman. Unlike the other bills, which both provide
language clearly aimed at overruling Newman,1 56 Reed-Menendez has no
language that appears to respond to Newman.! 57
Overall, the Reed-Menendez Bill may raise more questions than it
answers. Without clearer language, the bill either fundamentally changes
the basis of insider trading liability compared to the judicial regime, or it
imposes no change at all. More specific language will provide firmer
ground to help market actors, prosecutors, and the courts make decisions.
2.

The Himes Bill

Congressman Jim Himes of Connecticut proposed one of two bills
introduced in the House of Representatives, the Insider Trading
Prohibition Act.158 The bill seems to take many cues from the Insider
Trading Proscriptions Act ("S. 1380"), an earlier, but unsuccessful,
attempt to codify insider trading liability by statute." 9 The two bills are
similar in important aspects and take the same general approach to
structuring a ban on insider trading. 160

155. Compare United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 448 (2d Cir. 2014), cert.
denied, 84 U.S.L.W. 3170 (U.S. Oct. 5, 2015) (No. 15-137) ("[N]othing in the law
requires a symmetry of information in the nation's securities markets."), with S. 702 § 2
(inserting § 10(d)(1)(A) and arguably requiring symmetry of information in the securities
markets).
156. Ban Insider Trading Act of 2015, H.R. 1173, 114th Cong., § 2(a) (2015)
(inserting § 10(d)(2)(B)); Insider Trading Prohibition Act, H.R. 1625, 114th Cong., § 2
(2015) (inserting § 16A(c)(2)).
157. See generally S. 702.
158. Himes Release, supra note 134.
159. Insider Trading Proscriptions Act, S. 1380, 100th Cong. (1987). The bill was
part of a larger attempt to codify insider trading in the late 1980s that incorporated
proposals from the Senate, the SEC, and the NYSE Legal Advisory Committee. For a
more thorough discussion and analysis of this debate and the competing bills, see
generally Phillips & Lavoie, supra note 122.
160. See H.R. 1625 § 2; S. 1380 § 2 (adding § 16A to the Exchange Act defining
insider trading, prohibiting insider trading based on whether the "use" or
"communication" of material, nonpublic information would be "wrongful," providing
criminal liability for tipping information, and providing limitations on liability for
"control persons").
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The Himes Bill opens with a general ban on trading material,
nonpublic information about a security or the market for such security.16
Importantly, however, such trading is criminal only if the person knows
or recklessly disregards that the information was obtained "wrongfully,"
or that the use of such information would be "wrongful."l62 Thus, the
lynchpin for criminal liability under the Himes Bill is what is
"wrongful." The bill then defines "wrongful" as when information was
obtained by, or whose use would be: theft, bribery, misrepresentation,
espionage (by any means), a violation of federal laws protecting
computer data or computer privacy, conversion, misappropriation (or
other unauthorized and deceptive taking), or a breach of fiduciary duties
or other relationships of trust and confidence. 16 3 Thus, the Himes bill
attempts to restrict liability for insider trading by limiting the definition
of "wrongful" to specific conduct and practices.
Next, the Himes Bill criminalizes tipping by criminalizing
"wrongfully" communicating material, nonpublic information. 164 First,
under the bill, a tippee is liable if the tippee trades on the basis of such
information.16 ' Additionally, a tippee may be liable if the tippee further
tips such information and the next tippee trades on such information and
the second tippee's trading was reasonably foreseeable. 16 6
The Himes Bill also contains what this Comment refers to as an
anti-Newman clause, attempting to respond to the Second Circuit's
decision in Newman. The Himes Bill provides that liability is not
predicated on the defendant "know[ing] the specific means by which the
information was obtained or communicated, or whether any personal
benefit was paid or promised . . so long as the person [trading or
tipping] was aware[] or recklessly disregarded that such information was
wrongfully obtained or communicated."1 67
In addition, the Himes Bill leaves intact control person liability1 68
under § 20(a) of the Exchange Act, 169 but precludes liability "if such

161. H.R. 1625 § 2 (inserting § 16A(a)).
162. Id.
163. Id. § 2 (inserting §§ 16A(c)(l)(A)-(C)); see also S. 1380 § 2 (inserting §
16A(b)(1) and defining "wrongful" use as including theft, conversion, misappropriation,
or a breach of any fiduciary or other relationship of trust and confidence).
164. H.R. 1625 § 2 (inserting §§ 16A(b)(1)-(2)).
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. (inserting § 16A(c)(2)) (emphasis added).
168. See CHoI & PRITCHARD, supra note 16, at 306 (explaining that control person
liability is the idea that a person or entity which exercises control over a primary violator
can be held vicariously liable for the primary violation).
169. 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (2012) (providing joint and several liability for control
persons, who are liable "to the same extent" as primary violators if they "directly or
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controlling person or employer did not participate in, profit from, or
directly or indirectly induce the acts constituting [the primary
violation]."l7O Finally, the Himes Bill provides that the SEC may exempt
any person, security, or transaction, or classes thereof, from the
prohibitions of the bill.171 The prohibitions do not apply to persons
acting at the direction of an individual who would not be prohibited from
trading under the act. 172 Presumably, this exemption provides that, for
example, a broker not permitted to trade under the Act could still trade
for a client's account if directed to do so by a client who was not
otherwise prohibited from trading under the bill. 173
The Himes Bill, out of the three proposed bills, receives the highest
marks for clarity. The bill provides clear lines of liability by prohibiting
only "wrongful" use or communication of information, limited to a
specifically enumerated list of circumstances. 174 Furthermore, because
the conduct is wrongful "only" if it is included in this list of prohibited
activities, 175 the Himes Bill appears to limit liability for insider trading
only to those practices, giving clearer guidelines to market actors. This
limitation also provides courts, prosecutors, and the SEC with clarity on
how and when conduct is criminal or worthy of prosecution. Therefore,
the Himes Bill provides greater clarity than the existing insider trading
regime.
One concern, however, is that the Himes Bill incorporates concepts
from the existing judicial and regulatory regime about which there is no
definite consensus. Namely, the bill includes in its definition of
wrongful "a breach of any fiduciary duty or any other personal or other
relationship of trust and confidence." 7 6
However, there is not a
consensus among scholars or courts about the fiduciary duty standard of
liability, or whether that is the boundary of liability. 17 7

The fiduciary

duty standard, in particular, has been somewhat amorphous and
unpredictable. 17 8 The standard's inclusion in the Himes Bill, therefore,
introduces some uncertainty and the potential for unclear standards of
liability. Without some clarifying language, there would still be some
indirectly" controlled the primary violator, unless the control person "acted in good faith
and did not directly or indirectly induce the acts").
170. H.R. 1625 § 2 (inserting § 16A(d)).
171. Id. (inserting § 16A(e)).
172. Id.
173. See id.
174. Id. (inserting §§ 16A(a), 16A(c)(l)(A)-()).
175. Id. (inserting § 16A(c)(1)).
176. Id. (inserting § 16A(c)(1)(C)).
177. See, e.g., Painter,supra note 7, at 190-91 (observing that the scope of fiduciary
duties in the context of insider trading is unclear).
178. See Nagy, supra note 9, at 1340-48 (arguing that lower courts have ignored
fiduciary principles when adherence would result in an acquittal).
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continuing malleability for prosecutors and regulators to work with if the
Himes Bill were to become law. However, the Himes Bill still provides
the greatest clarity out of the three proposed bills.
With respect to overcriminalization, there are two considerations
relevant to the Himes Bill. First, as discussed above, the Himes Bill
limits liability exclusively to certain conduct that constitutes "wrongful"
use or communication.179 Therefore, the Himes Bill theoretically limits
liability to a set universe of conduct and, unlike the Reed-Menendez Bill,
does not impose an unduly broad standard of liability.
However, when compared to the judicial regime of insider trading,
the Himes Bill expands the universe of conduct that constitutes insider
trading. The judicial and regulatory regime of insider trading is, at least
ostensibly, rooted in breaches of fiduciary or fiduciary-like duties.so
The Himes Bill, however, lists other kinds of "wrongful" conduct beyond
breaches of fiduciary or other duties.181 Furthermore, the list of
"wrongful" actions in the bill criminalizes conduct that is not insider
trading under the current regime. 182 One example is the Himes Bill's
inclusion of "theft" under its definition of "wrongful" conduct. 183
It is not settled whether stealing information and then trading on the
basis of that information is insider trading. At the outset, because many
thieves are outsiders with no other relationship to the company about
which the information pertains, there is generally no fiduciary duty owed
by a thief to that company or the party with whom they are trading.'8
However, the Second Circuit held in SEC v. Dorozhko 85 that a
computer hacker who stole a company's earnings information and then
purchased stock options based on that information could be held liable
for insider trading.' 8 6 In that case, the Second Circuit reasoned that, in
order to give rise to liability, the method of theft had to be "deceptive"

179. H.R. 1625 § 2 (inserting §§ 16A(c)(1)(A)C)).
180. Compare United States v. Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222, 232-33 (1980) (premising
liability on a breach of a fiduciary relationship), with United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S.
642, 652-53 (1997) (premising liability on a breach of a duty to the source of the
information). But see Saikrishna Prakash, Our DysfunctionalInsider Trading Regime, 99
CoLUM. L. REv. 1491, 1512 (1999) (considering some of the Supreme Court's other Rule
lob-5 jurisprudence and arguing that a breach of fiduciary duty is "neither necessary nor
sufficient for Rule lob-5 liability").
181. H.R. 1625 § 2 (inserting §§ 16A(c)(1)(A)C)).
182. Id.
183. Id. (inserting § 16A(c)(1)(A)).
184. See, e.g., SEC v. Dorozhko, 606 F. Supp. 2d 321, 336 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (holding
that a hacker who traded on information he had stolen owed no fiduciary duty to the other
parties to his securities transactions or the source of the information), rev'd, 574 F.3d 42
(2d Cir. 2009).
185. SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2009).
186. Id. at 44-45, 49-51.
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within the meaning of § 10(b). 187 For example, the court suggested that
misrepresenting one's identity in order to gain access to information and
stealing that information would be "deceptive theft" giving rise to
liability under § 10(b). 188 In contrast, the court suggested that some
kinds of hacking would not be "deceptive," but only "mere theft," not
giving rise to liability.189 Thus, courts may allow some kinds of theft, but
not others, to give rise to insider trading liability.
The Himes Bill, however, goes beyond Dorozhko's holding. First,
by listing breaches of fiduciary duty as separate from other kinds of
"wrongful" conduct, 190 the Himes Bill implies that a breach of fiduciary
duty is not necessary for insider trading liability. This provision seems
to codify the Second Circuit's holding in Dorozhko.19 1 However, in
contrast to Dorozhko's holding, the Himes Bill states that all theft,
deceptive or otherwise, gives rise to liability for insider trading if the
stolen information is then used in a trade. 192 The Himes Bill thus goes
further than courts previously had, or were able to under § 10(b)'s
jurisprudential limitations, and expands insider trading liability to
previously legal conduct.
In sum, the Himes Bill attempts to expand insider trading liability to
conduct that was not criminal under the judicial and regulatory regime of
insider trading. Despite this expansion, however, the Himes Bill also
limits liability by "only" attaching liability to the enumerated list of
"wrongful" conduct. 19 3
Thus, the Himes Bill provides for some
expansion of criminality while still providing clear limits and a clear
scope, avoiding the kind of unclear scope that undercuts both the ReedMenendez Bill and the Lynch Bill. 194
Although the Himes Bill
incorporates some amorphous concepts like the breach of fiduciary duty
standard, because the it attempts to establish definite contours of
criminality, it avoids overcriminalization.

187. Id. at 51.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Insider Trading Prohibition Act, H.R. 1625, 114th Cong., § 2 (2015) (inserting §
§§ 16A(c)(1)(A)-(C)).
191. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d at 49 (noting that a breach of a fiduciary duty satisfies the
requirement of a "deceptive device or contrivance" under § 10(b), but that "what is
sufficient is not always what is necessary").
192. H.R. 1625 § 2 (inserting § 16A(c)(1)(A)). Professor John Coffee observed that
Dorozhko's distinction was understandable given existing case law, but the line between
"deceptive" theft and "mere" theft was a "questionable line" that only "doctrine-obsessed
(but morally myopic) lawyers" could be satisfied with. John C. Coffee Jr., Introduction:
Mapping the Future of Insider Trading Law: Of Boundaries, Gaps, and Strategies, 2013
COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 281, 295 (2013).
193. H.R. 1625 § 2 (inserting §§ 16A(c)(1)(A)C)).
194. See infra Parts III.C.1 and III.C.3.
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Concerning the Himes Bill's impact on the status quo, similar
concerns are relevant. Because the Himes Bill expands liability to new
forms of conduct,' 95 it would disrupt the status quo in some ways.
However, because the Himes Bill also provides for limits on "wrongful"
conduct,1 96 the bill would likely provide for long-term stability by
reducing the constant tug-of-war between prosecutors and courts over the
outer limits of insider trading liability. Although there will likely be
some debate over the Himes Bill's outer limits of liability, the bill's
slight disruption to the status quo at the outset should be outweighed by
its long-term stabilizing effects for market actors, prosecutors, regulators,
and the courts.
Finally, the Himes Bill's anti-Newman clause essentially means that
as long as a tippee knows generally that information was wrongfully
obtained or communicated, the tippee is liable even if he or she was not
aware of the specific personal benefit given to induce the initial tipper or
latter tippee/tippers.1 9 7 This clause seems to largely, but not entirely,
undo the Second Circuit's decision in Newman.
Newman specifically held that, to be liable, a tippee must know the
information was divulged for a personal benefit. 19 8 The Himes Bill still
requires some evidence that the defendant knew or recklessly
disregarded that the information was wrongfully obtained or
communicated.1 99 However, if information is only "wrongfully"
communicated in breach of a fiduciary duty because it was
communicated in exchange for a personal benefit, the defendant would
still need to have some general knowledge that a benefit was received in
order to know of the breach of fiduciary duty.2 00 One could not know
that the communication was wrongful without knowledge that a personal
benefit was received. It seems, then, that the Himes Bill keeps alive
threads of Newman's holding by requiring some general knowledge or
reckless disregard that some benefit was received, but does not require
knowledge of what the specific benefit to the tipper was.
195. H.R. 1625 § 2 (inserting §§ 16A(c)(1)(A)-(C)).
196. Id.
197. See id. (inserting § 16A(c)(2)).
198. United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 448 (2d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 84
U.S.L.W. 3170 (U.S. Oct. 5,2015) (No. 15-137).
199. H.R. 1625 § 2 (inserting § 16A(c)(2)). However, Professor John Coffee, the
author of the Himes Bill, has argued that the personal benefit standard should be
eliminated entirely and implies that the Himes Bill "does basically [that]." John C.
Coffee, How to Get Away With Insider Trading, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2016,
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/23/opinion/how-to-get-away-with-insidertrading.html?_r-0. However, for reasons explained below, this Comment disagrees with
this implication.
200. See Newman, 773 F.3d at 447; United States v. Whitman, 904 F. Supp. 2d 363,
371 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
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While the Himes Bill's anti-Newman clause would thus provide an
important limit on Newman's reach and the government's burden of
proof, it is not clear that the Himes Bill would actually have produced a
different result in Newman itself. The Newman decision does not clearly
state whether the tippee must know of the specific benefit given to the
tipper, or whether the tippee need only have general knowledge that a
benefit was given to the tipper-the Second Circuit's language suggests
it could be either.201 Moreover, the Newman court's actual holding
provides no additional guidance because the court held that the evidence
did not establish the defendants had any knowledge of any personal
benefit, specific or general, to the tippers.202 As such, if the Himes Bill
still requires some general knowledge that a benefit was conferred,
Newman and Chiasson would likely still have been acquitted. Thus,
although the Himes Bill's anti-Newman clause provides an important
limitation on Newman's holding, it would not appear to totally eradicate
Newman.
Therefore, the Himes Bill would alter existing insider trading
liability in important ways. By expanding liability to certain kinds of
conduct not previously criminalized, the bill would make more conduct
off-limits for market participants. However, by providing an exclusive
list of conduct giving rise to liability, the bill would also provide greater
stability and predictability for market participants, prosecutors,
regulators, and the courts. Finally, the bill would take important steps to
limit, if not entirely eliminate, the Second Circuit's holding in Newman.
3.

The Lynch Bill

The third and final bill, the Lynch Bill, was introduced in the House
of Representatives.203 The Lynch Bill and the Himes Bill are similar in
important ways-both attempt to outline the contours of insider trading
liability by giving definitions to certain qualifying terms and both contain
anti-Newman clauses.204 However, the differences between the two bills,
including their different approaches to mutual efforts, are crucial.

201.

Compare, e.g., Newman, 773 F.3d at 448 ("[W]ithout establishing that the

tippee knows of the personal benefit received by the insider . .. the Government cannot
meet its burden of showing that the tippee knew of a breach.") (emphasis added), with id.
at 450-51 ("[T]he Government had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Newman and
Chiasson knew that the tippers received a personal benefit . . .") (emphasis added). But
see Whitman, 904 F. Supp. 2d at 371 (holding that the tippee need only have general
knowledge of a benefit to the tipper).
202. Newman, 773 F.3d at 453.
203. Lynch Release, supra note 134.
204. Ban Insider Trading Act of 2015, H.R. 1173, 114th Cong., § 2(a) (2015); H.R.
1625 § 2.
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The Lynch Bill would add § 10(d) to the Exchange Act.205 This bill
prohibits any trading on the basis of information that the person knows,
or should know, is "material information and inside information." 2 06
"Inside" information is defined as information that is either:
1)
nonpublic and obtained "illegally;" 2) from an issuer with an
"expectation of confidentiality" or for use only for legitimate business
purposes; or 3). "in violation of a fiduciary duty." 2 07 "Material"
information is information about the issuer or security that would likely
impact the security's price. 2 08
The Lynch Bill contains several other key clauses. First, the bill
seems to make its provisions non-exclusive by explicitly stating that it
does not affect liability under § 10(b) of the Exchange Act.209 In the
bill's anti-Newman clause, the bill states that for insider trading liability
"a personal benefit to any party" is not necessary. 2 10 Finally, the bill
takes aim at tipping by establishing liability for violating § 10(d) if a
person "intentionally discloses without a legitimate business purpose"
information that they know or should know is material and insider
*
211
information.

The Lynch Bill has two issues. First, the lynchpin of liability in the
Lynch Bill is whether information is material and inside information.
The Lynch Bill defines "inside" information as all information that is
nonpublic and obtained "illegally." 2 12 However, "illegally" is nowhere
defined or qualified, leading to unanswered questions. Does it mean
obtained in violation of only criminal law, or civil law as well? Is it
limited to federal law, or does it include state law too? Does the word
mean statutes only, or also administrative regulations?
These
unanswered questions leave the scope of liability undefined and
ambiguous.
The "illegally" clause's unclear scope seriously undercuts the
Lynch Bill's clarity and breadth of criminality, which would likely lead
to extensive litigation to determine its scope. In contrast to the Himes
Bill, which provides for specific enumerated actions which give rise to
liability,2 13 the "illegally" clause could criminalize much more conduct,

and its uncertain scope leaves market actors, prosecutors, regulators, and
205. H.R. 1173 § 2(a).
206. Id. (inserting § 10(d)(1)).
207. Id. (inserting § 10(d)(3)(A)).
208. Id. (inserting § 10(d)(3)(B)).
209. Id. (inserting § 10(d)(2)(A)).
210. Id. (inserting § 10(d)(2)(B)).
211. Id. § 2(b)(2) (inserting § 20(e)(2)).
212. Id. § 2(a) (inserting §§ 10(d)(3)(A)(i), 10(d)(3)(A)(ii)(I)).
213. Insider Trading Prohibition Act, H.R. 1625, 114th Cong., § 2 (2015) (inserting
§§ 16A(c)(1)(A)-(C)).
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courts to wonder what conduct is prohibited. Therefore, the clause is
ambiguous, potentially very broad, and raises clarity and
overcriminalization concerns.
Second, another key issue with the Lynch Bill's clarity is the bill's
anti-Newman clause. The bill provides that, for insider trading liability,
"a personal benefit to any person" is not required.2 14 In contrast to the
Himes Bill, which only provides that the tippee need not know of the
personal benefit, 215 the Lynch Bill implies that there need not be any
personal benefit at all for a tippee to be liable.216 Moreover, as discussed
below, it is unclear if- the Lynch Bill removes the personal benefit
requirement for tippers, which impacts both clarity and
overcriminalization concerns.
The Lynch Bill's anti-Newman
clause raises , senous
overcriminalization concerns by removing the personal benefit
requirement for tippees who trade on the basis of material, inside
This standard stands in stark contrast to the tippee
information.27
liability standard in Dirks, where the Court explained that the tippee's
breach is derivative of the tipper's breach of fiduciary duty, and the
tipper's breach is based on the receipt of a personal benefit. 2 18 The
Lynch Bill appears to eliminate that requirement so that even without
any personal benefit to the tipper, a tippee who trades on the basis of
material, nonpublic information is liable. 2 19 However, this clause also
raises a different question--does the bill eliminate the personal benefit
requirement for tipper liability?
At first blush, based on the language of the clause, the answer
seems to be "no." The Lynch Bill's elimination of the personal benefit
requirement applies only to "this subsection," apparently meaning §
10(d). 22 0 However, liability for tippers in the Lynch Bill is not contained
in § 10(d), but rather in an amendment to § 20(e) of the Exchange Act.221
Thus, on its face, the removal of the personal benefit requirement does
not appear to apply to tippers.
However, there is a strong opposing argument that the removal of
the personal benefit requirement does apply to tipper liability. The plain
text of the amendment to § 20(e) suggests there is no requirement.22 2
214.

H.R. 1173 § 2(a) (inserting § 10(d)(2)(B)).

215.
H.R. 1625 § 2 (inserting § 16A(c)(2)). But see supranote 199 (noting a broader
reading of the Himes bill's Anti-Newman clause).

216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

See H.R. 1173 § 2(a) (inserting § 10(d)(2)(B)).
Id.
Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 662 (1983).
H.R. 1173 § 2(a) (inserting § 10(d)(2)(B)).
Id.
Id. § 2(b) (inserting § 20(e)(2)).
See H.R. 1173 § 2(a) (inserting § 10(d)(2)(B)).
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However, it implies that any disclosure of material, inside information
without a "legitimate business purpose" gives rise to liability. 223 Nothing
in the amendment suggests that there must be a personal benefit to
establish a lack of a legitimate business purpose.224 Second, the fact that
the tipping ban references § 10(d) (in that a violation of its prohibition is
a violation of § 10(d)) 2 2 5 suggests an interrelation between the two
provisions and that the anti-Newman clause should be read as applying to
both provisions. These two considerations, coupled with Congress's
apparent desire to eliminate the personal benefit requirement via the
Lynch Bill's strong anti-Newman clause, suggest that the removal of the
personal benefit standard also applies to tipper liability.
Removing the personal benefit requirement for tipper liability
would constitute a vast departure from Dirks. The Court in Dirks held
that the persons who gave Dirks information had not breached their duty
because they received no personal benefit and acted only to expose the
company's fraud.226 Because no breach by the tippers occurred, there
was no breach by Dirks when he communicated the information to
others.22 7 But if the Lynch Bill removes the personal benefit requirement
for tippers, then Dirks' sources, 228 and Dirks himself as a tipper, would
likely have been liable. Thus, the Lynch Bill's anti-Newman clause
could potentially sweep vast amounts of conduct into the gamut of
criminality by expanding liability to essentially all tippees who trade on
the basis of material, inside information or who communicate material,
inside information.
In addition to criminalizing a large amount of previously legal
conduct, the Lynch Bill would have a huge impact on the status quo.
Although, like the Himes Bill, the Lynch Bill attempts to expand liability
to certain types of conduct, the scope of the bill's "illegally" clause is far
less certain than the parallel clause in the Himes Bill. Furthermore, as
discussed above, the anti-Newman clause could eliminate the Dirks'
personal benefit requirement and drastically change the standards for
tipper and tippee liability.2 29 The Lynch Bill thus presents potentially
huge changes to the current regime of insider trading liability.

223. Id.
224. See id.
225. Id.
226. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 666-67 (1983).
227. Id. at 667.
228. However, there might be an argument that exposing fraud was a legitimate
business purpose.
229. See suprapp. 249-50.
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IV. MOVING FORWARD ON INSIDER TRADING LEGISLATION

Having dissected and criticized each post-Newman bill, this
Comment would be remiss not to make a few recommendations for
changes that Congress should consider if it moves forward with
explicitly codifying insider trading liability. This Comment recommends
that Congress use the Himes Bill as a building block because, as the
analysis above 230 indicates, this Comment takes the position that the
Himes Bill is the strongest proposal.
First, given the potential bill's importance to the definition of
insider trading, the new bill should provide definitions of the terms
"material" information and "nonpublic" information.
Numerous
definitions of materiality in the securities law context currently exist.231
Congress could provide clarity by defining materiality, for example, to
mean where "there is a substantial likelihood that the [information]
would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having
significantly altered the 'total mix' of information made available."232 In
defining "nonpublic," the definition of "inside" information in the Lynch
Bill provides a clear starting point.233 Regardless of the formulations
chosen, clear definitions of "material" and "nonpublic" would help
market actors identify when they cannot act.
Next, a bill's articulation of specific instances where
communicating material, nonpublic information would not give rise to
tipping liability under the law would provide greater clarity. Although
the Himes Bill's definition of tipping is not too broad, it would be
prudent to define some protected communications that should not be
criminalized even if they technically fall under the prohibition in some
circumstances. For example, Congress could exempt communications
made to lawyers for the purpose of obtaining legal advice when such
communications would be protected by the attorney-client privilege.
Clear exemptions for certain communications would provide greater
certainty about what conduct would give rise to tipping liability.
Additionally, because the Himes Bill's anti-Newman clause has an
uncertain scope, 234 its language needs clarification. For example, the
language could be changed to "it shall not be necessary that the person
know ... whether a specific personal benefit was promised, offered, or
received to or by any person in the chain of communications, so long as
230. See supraPart III.C.2 (analyzing the Himes Bill).
231. CHOI & PRITCHARD, supra note 16, at 47-94 (covering various definitions of
materiality applied by courts).
232. TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1978).
233. See Ban Insider Trading Act of 2015, H.R. 1173, 114th Cong., § 2(a) (2015)
(inserting § 10(d)(3)(A)).
234. See supraPart III.C.2.
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the trading person knew, or recklessly disregarded, the general facts
making such communication wrongful . . . ." Such a change would
explain that specific knowledge of the benefit is not necessary so long as
there was general knowledge that there was a.benefit, thus clarifying the
clause's limitation in Newman.
On a related note, Congress could also take steps to define what is
considered a "personal benefit" for the purposes of breaches of fiduciary
duty giving rise to insider trading and tipper/tippee liability. Because
courts are in disagreement about what constitutes a personal benefit,23 a
clearer definition of "personal benefit" would help market actors better
conform their conduct to the law. The definition need not be narrowCongress could include as many benefits as it wants in the scope of
liability, limited only by what Congress considers an impermissible quid
pro quo. Congress could include money; any object of potential
pecuniary value; preferential treatment or status; other material,
nonpublic information; or other information of potential pecuniary value
in the definition of "personal benefit."
By providing a specific
definition, Congress would set clearer guidelines for market actors,
prosecutors, and the courts to identify prohibited conduct.
The discussion above should not be taken as an exclusive list of
changes Congress should consider. Even among the suggestions made,
there is considerable latitude for Congress to provide more or less
specificity for what conduct should be considered illegal insider trading.
The final state of the bill will ultimately rely on policy judgments by
Congress about what conduct it wants to criminalize. If Congress
chooses a broad prohibition, then the final legislation will look much like
the Reed-Menendez Bill.2 3 6 On the other hand, choosing a narrower
prohibition like the Himes Bill will require carefully chosen language to
avoid confusion among market actors and distortion by the courts.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Second Circuit's decision in United States v. Newman has
triggered an important debate about insider trading in Congress and has
created an opportunity to accomplish an as-yet elusive goal: the explicit
statutory codification of insider trading liability. In Newman's wake,
three bills were introduced to codify insider trading liability. Each bill
235. Compare United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 452 (2d Cir. 2014), cert.
denied, 84 U.S.L.W. 3170 (U.S. Oct. 5, 2015) (No. 15-137) (requiring a showing of some
potential for gain), with United States v. Salman, 792 F.3d 1087, 1093 (9th Cir. 2015)
cert. granted, 84 U.S.L.W. 3401 (U.S. Jan. 19, 2016) (No. 15-628) (holding that a
relationship and gift of information is enough).
236. See supra Part III.C.1 (discussing the provisions of Reed-Menendez and its
potentially broad scope).
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takes a different approach to prohibiting insider trading and offers
different responses to the Second Circuit's decision in Newman.
This Comment has examined each of these bills in turn, analyzing
the different approaches each bill takes and considering each against the
existing judicial and regulatory regime of insider trading liability. Each
bill has its own strengths and weaknesses. Although the, details and
impact of each bill is important in its own right, particularly if one of the
bills moves forward toward becoming law, an overarching point also
becomes clear. If Congress finally takes the important step of codifying
insider trading liability by statute then it must proceed carefully, clearly,
and purposefully.
Even small differences between the bills have
profound consequences for each bill's scope and impact. Insider trading
liability remains a fluid concept, the subject of extensive academic and
legal debate, and an area of law where every minute detail is hotly
contested. Any weakness in a statutory codification of liability will be
litigated within an inch of its life and pried open to the widest extent
possible by defense lawyers and prosecutors.
Therefore, if any of the proposed bills move forward, Congress
must take steps to make the law clear and carefully outline the contours
of liability. Congress must also consider the existing regime's failings
and take affirmative steps to resolve current issues. Anything less would
turn an opportunity long-awaited into an opportunity lost.

